

# Security Update for z/OS V2R2

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# Agenda

- **Digital certificate related Enhancements**
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  - PKI multiple approvers
  - Kerberos PKINIT
  - System SSL
- **RACF Enhancements**
  - Read-Only Auditor
  - RRSF Enhancements
  - IRRDBU00 authority change
  - Password Enhancements (In a separate session)
  - Health checks
  - Enhancements for z/OS UNIX
- **ICSF Enhancements**
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- **SMF Enhancements**
  - Record Signing
  - New record for Callable service
- **Security Portal**

## **Digital Certificate related Enhancements**

## RACDCERT Granular Authority

- RACF RACDCERT functions are used to manage certificates and key rings
- **Currently, the authority to issue RACDCERT commands is controlled using profiles in the FACILITY class with resources named** `IRR.DIGTCERT.<racdcert function>`
  - READ authority allows you to act on your own certificate or key ring
  - UPDATE allows you to act on the certificate of another user
  - CONTROL allows you to act on a CERTAUTH or SITE resource
- **The control is based on the function performed and the owner, not to the level of individual certificate or key ring**

## RACDCERT Granular Authority

- **New model is to provide granular control based on certificate label or key ring name, besides function and owner using the RDATA LIB class**
  - `IRR.DIGTCERT.<cert owner>.<cert label>.UPD.<racdcert cert function>`

*Note: LST may be applicable to some functions*
  - `<ring owner>.<ring name>.UPD.<racdcert ring function>`
- **Granular control is turned on by the presence of the profile IRR.RACDCERT.GRANULAR in the RDATA LIB class, otherwise fall back to original way using the FACILITY class profile**
- **Applies to 13 RACDCERT functions only, including GENCERT, ADD, ADDRING, CONNECT...**
- **Only one level of access – READ**
- **Example: AdminA can generate a certificate for FTPID with label FTPSERVER if he has READ access to**

```
IRR.DIGTCERT.FTPID.FTPSERVER.UPD.GENCERT
```

## PKI Services: Multiple Administrative Approvals

- **PKI Services provides Certificate Authority functions for enterprises to host their own CA**
- **PKI Services supports both automatic approval mode and administrator approval mode**
- **In the administrator approval mode, only one administrator is required to approve the requests**
- **Some government agencies require all PKI products to have an “NxM” authentication factor**
  - For example, two PKI administrators have to validate a request before issuing the certificate
- **PKI Services will now allow the administrator approval mode to support multiple number of approvers**
- **A configuration option will be provided in the CGI templates file and JSP templates xml file to set the number of administrators required to approve a certificate request**
  - The option will be provided on a per template basis
  - A change of the configured number of approvers will not affect the existing certificate requests, only affect the new requests

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## PKI Services: OCSP

- Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is used to get revocation status of certificates. Intended to validate certificates used for SSL and TLS
- OCSP requires server responses to be signed but does not specify a mechanism for selecting the signing algorithm to be used
- Prior to z/OS V2.2, z/OS PKI Services could only use the same signing algorithm used for certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) signing specified in the configuration file to sign the OCSP response
- PKI Services can now sign the OCSP response with the client specified signing algorithm through an extension in the request in the way documented by RFC6227



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## System SSL: OCSP

- System SSL provides the set of functions for secure communication required by other components running on z/OS
- Certificate validation involves checking of the certificate status. There are two ways. Before V2R2, System SSL only provides the Certificate Revocation List checking mechanism.
- In this release, System SSL retrieves revocation status information for x.509 certificates as described by RFC 2560, RFC 3280 and 5280
- Enable other components like Communications Server, HTTP server, Kerberos applications to check certificate status using SSL/TLS protocol

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## System SSL: Secure key and interoperability

- Support for the secure key functions available with CEX4 and later crypto features on zEC12 and later processors when configured in EP11 mode
- Supporting secure DSA keys for signing
- To establish the SSL/TLS protocol, both the server and the client need to have a collection of keys and certificates.
  - Examples of this collection are RACF key rings, gskkyman key database, ICSF tokens.
  - In this release System supports PKCS #12 file as a key store database, which is commonly used by Java-based applications
- Allow SSL sessions to be reused across different TCP ports

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## NAS (Kerberos): PKINIT support and UID 0 removal

- Network Authentication Service is a distributed authentication service that allows user authentication over a physically untrusted network by using tickets issued by a mutually trusted authentication server
- The ticket is encrypted by a secret key which is typically derived from the client's password
- Instead of using password, digital certificate is used to obtain the initial ticket as specified by RFC 4556
- Another enhancement is to lift the requirement of using UID 0 for the Kerberos started task

# RACF Enhancements

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## Read-Only Auditor

- **The read-only auditor (ROAUDIT) user attribute grants the user the ability to perform all of the activities of a user with the AUDITOR attribute except the ability to:**
  - Change profile content (such as AUDIT/GLOBALAUDIT settings)
  - Change system logging options
- **Suitable for use by an external auditor who may need to verify the current security state of a system**
- **Assigned to users with the ADDUSER and ALTUSER commands**
- **If ROAUDIT and AUDITOR are set, AUDITOR attribute takes precedence**

## RRSF: Dynamic Main Switching

- **RACF's Remote Sharing Facility (RRSF) allows you to manage remote RACF databases from anywhere in the RRSF network**
- **RRSF system consists of nodes**
  - **Single System Node** – one system, one RACF DB
  - **Multi System Node** – a set of systems sharing one RACF DB
    - **MAIN system** – communicator to the other nodes
    - **Peer systems** – can only communicate to the MAIN system of the other nodes
- **Switching the MAIN system in a multi system node is a challenging “11”-step manual processes that is not feasible for short-term changes**
- **RRSF Dynamic Main Switching allows you to replace this complicated process with a single command**
  - Allows you to avoid even minor outage windows
  - Allows you to move RRSF workload off of a busy system
  - New programming interfaces introduce possibility of automating the switch entirely

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## RRSF: Unidirectional Connections

- **When two systems are connected using RRSF, it is impossible to prevent a privileged user on one system from escalating his privilege on the other system.**
  - This issue is worsen if one system is a “test” system
- **With Unidirectional RRSF connections, one RRSF node can define another RRSF node such that inbound requests from that node are denied**
  - This can help protect against accidental or malicious damage to your production system
  - You can demonstrate to an auditor your compliance with your security policy, regardless of the configuration established on the remote node

## RRSF: Unidirectional Connections

- The **DENYINBOUND** keyword on the **TARGET** command is used to reject commands from the specified node:

```
TARGET NODE(thatnode) DENYINBOUND
```

- **When the remote node is a multi system node:**

```
TARGET NODE(thatnode) SYSNAME(*) DENYINBOUND
```

- **To change your mind, use ALLOWINBOUND.**
  - This is the default, so you don't need to code it in the parameter library
- **DENYINBOUND is ignored if specified for the LOCAL node**



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## IRRDBU00: Require only READ Authority

- IRRDBU00 is a utility to unload the RACF database
- Since its inception, IRRDBU00 has required UPDATE authority to the RACF data set(s) which are used as input
- With V2.2, if you specify PARM=NOLOCKINPUT, only READ authority is required

## RACF Health Checks related to Password enhancements

- **RACF\_ENCRYPTION\_ALGORITHM**, which raises an exception if “weak” (less 'secure' than DES) encryption is allowed for logon passwords
  - Having no ICHDEX01 is considered an exception as the absence of ICHDEX01 allows masked passwords
- **RACF\_PASSWORD\_CONTROLS**, which raises an exception if:
  - Mixed case passwords are not in effect or
  - The maximum number of consecutive failed logon attempts is greater than 3 or
  - A password/password phrase can be valid for more than 90 days

## **z/OS UNIX: Authority just for Search**

- **When opening a file in the z/OS UNIX directory, the user must have READ and SEARCH authority on all directories in the path to the file**
  - Even if the user has an administrative authority such as SUPERUSER.FILESYS.CHANGEPERMS
  - Many installations have just granted those users a higher-than-desired authority such as AUDITOR or SUPERUSER.FILESYS
- **READ authority to the resource SUPERUSER.FILESYS.DIRSRCH in the UNIXPRIV class grants the user read and search permissions on z/OS UNIX directories**
  - Does not grant read, write, or execute permission to ordinary z/OS UNIX files
  - Does not grant write permission to z/OS UNIX directories
  - Generic profiles are supported

## z/OS UNIX: File Execution Control

- **Using profiles in the new FSEEXEC class, installations can prevent the execution of files within the file system**
  - Profile name must match the FILESYSTEM name (not the MOUNTPOINT) specified on the MOUNT statement
  - Generic profiles are supported
  - Useful for file system that is mounted for temporary directories such as /tmp where any user can write files
  - UPDATE access is required
  - SUPERUSER or AUDITOR does not override FSEEXEC denial of access
- **Example:**

```
RDEFINE FSEEXEC OMVS.ZFS.ADMIN.** UACC(NONE)
PERMIT OMVS.ZFS.ADMIN.** CLASS(FSEEXEC) ID(FRED) ACC(UPDATE)
```

# ICSF Enhancements

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## New ICSF callable services for simplification

- **As financial institutions migrate to the use of IC (Integrated Chip) cards, payment system applications are being developed using the EMV (Europay, MasterCard, and Visa) standard**
- **Although ICSF supports all the encryption primitives necessary for EMV based applications, there is added complexity using native CCA services to implement EMV encryption techniques**
- **ICSF will provide a new set of callable services tuned to the EMV standard to ease the development and migration of payment systems to the use of IC cards**

## PIN method improvements

- **Enhancement to provide additional support for the German Banking Industry Committee (Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft (DK)) PIN method**
  - Use AES keys to manage card and account data
  - New callable service to manage PINs, card data and account data
    - CSNBDMP and CSNEDMP
    - generates a PIN and PIN reference value (PRW) for an existing ISO-1 PIN block
  - Provide a service to migrate ISO-1 format PIN blocks to DK PIN block

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## Misc supports

- Provide support for the TKE workstation to loaded HMAC keys and for ICSF to import them into the CKDS using Operational Key Load
- Provide an option to allow customers to specify the number of digits of the master key verification patterns to display on the Hardware Status panel for auditing purpose
- Provide a new display on the Domain Role panel that shows the access control name and its offset



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## Console Support (WD#15)

- **Enables customers to perform certain administrative tasks from z/OS operator console rather than using ISPF panels**
- **Two new operator commands: "DISPLAY ICSF" and "SETICSF"**
  - Activate, deactivate, and restart cryptographic devices
  - Enable and disable I/O updates to Key Datasets (KDS)
  - Set and display certain ICSF installation options
  - Display status for ICSF cryptographic devices
  - Display master key status for each cryptographic device
  - Display information related to KDSes
  - List sysplex members who can participate in sysplex-scope commands

# SMF Enhancements

## Sign SMF Records

- System Management Facility (SMF) provides logging services for z/OS
- SMF records contain critical information about an enterprise and are archived for long durations and they are generally shared among various departments for a number of activities
- There is no built in protection of the SMF data
- Idea is to make SMF a fully-trusted repository of audit data using digital signature
- SMF data is signed on the way to the System Logger
- Calls ICSF PKCS#11 functions to generate key pair
- Enable through the new SMF configuration option RECSIGN  
`RECSIGN (HASH (SHA512) , SIGNATURE (RSA) ,  
TOKENNAME (TAMPER#RESISTANT#SMF#TOKEN#NAME1) )`
- The log stream (IFASMF DL) and dataset (IFASMF DP) dump programs are enhanced to handle the signed records  
`SIGVALIDATE (HASH (SHA512) ,  
TOKENNAME (TAMPER#RESISTANT#SMF#TOKEN#NAME1) )`

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## Create SMF Records for BCPii Callable Service

- Two BPCii callable services HWICMD and HWISET are identified as the services that can affect significant impact on a customers installation
- Need a way to audit any changes to the system through these callable services
- New SMF record type 106 is created with 2 subtypes:
  - Subtype 1 – for HWISET
  - Sybtype 2 – for HWICMD

## System z Security Portal

- IBM recommends that you promptly install security and integrity PTFs
- SECINT PTFs are included in RSUs periodically
- The System z Security Portal can help you stay more current with SECINT PTFs by providing SMP/E HOLDDATA you can use to identify these fixes before they are marked RSU
- The System z Security Portal also provides associated Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) V2 ratings for new APARs\*
- To get this information you must register!
  - Because widespread specifics about a vulnerability could increase the likelihood that an attacker could successfully exploit it
  - In response to customer requests to maintain the confidentiality
- IBM recommends that you to register to the System z Security Portal site

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## Helpful Publications on the enhancements

- SA23-2290 - z/OS Security Server RACF Callable Services
- SA23-2292 - z/OS Security Server RACF Command Language Reference
- SA23-2289 - z/OS Security Server RACF Security Administrator's Guide
- SA23-2286 - z/OS Cryptographic Services PKI Services Guide and Reference
- SC14-7495 - z/OS Cryptographic Services System SSL Programming
- SC23-6786 - z/OS Integrated Security Services Network Authentication Service Administration
- SC23-6787 - z/OS Integrated Security Services Network Authentication Service Programming
- SA23-2231 - z/OS ICSF Writing PKCS #11 Applications
- SC14-7506 - ICSF Administrator's Guide
- SC14-7507 - ICSF System Programmer's Guide
- SC14-7508 - ICSF Application Programmer's Guide
- SA23-6843 - IBM Health Checker for z/OS User's Guide
- SA38-0667 - z/OS MVS System Management Facilities (SMF)